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Abstract. Children are using the internet more and more, and from a younger age. This is despite the commonly 
known dangers of predators. There is no policing of the internet, nor would it be possible to instigate. Parents are 
in the difficult position of trying to monitor and control their children’s internet usage, when more often than not 
the children know the technology better than they do. This can lead to either ineffective measures, or measures that 
the children will deliberately circumvent for their own privacy. There are also technical issues that are far from 
trivial. The problem of distinguishing the dialogue of a child from a predator pretending to be a child is extremely 
difficult. This paper presents a solution which can accurately identify threats, while satisfying the apparently 
conflicting needs for safety of, and privacy for, the children. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper looks at the problem of protecting children from on-line stalkers/predators. A recent survey of 1,500 
children (aged 10-17) in the United States found that approximately 1 in 7 (13%) received unwanted sexual 
solicitations, and 34% communicated online with people they did not know in person (Wolak, Mitchell & 
Finkelhor, 2006). This often took the form of crude or vulgar comments in chat rooms - the victims were not 
bothered and handled the situation well. However some victims felt traumatised and some are targets of aggressive 
online solicitations (Mitchell, K., Finkelhor & Wolak. 2007). There is also a growing gap between what children 
do online, and what their parents think they are doing (Lemish, 2008). With the increased importance of the 
internet in all of our lives, there is more and more pressure on children to be active on-line, and from a younger 
age. The dangers permeate almost the entire internet, and change rapidly as the technology evolves. Parents are ill-
equipped to protect their children through no fault of their own, but (partly) because while they did grow up in a 
society where these threats existed, they did not exist in this new form. Today’s reductions in barriers to 
communication have made the problem of protecting children much more complex. Children are often taught not 
to talk to strangers but with the variety of social interactions available today, teaching a child to block all 
communications from unknown parties would be challenging to even the most technically minded parent. This is 
probably undesirable too (Wolak, Finkelhor, Mitchell, & Ybarra. 2008) 
This area has understandably received a lot of attention. There is a wide variety of content-control software 
available to prevent children from accessing illicit material. This mainly works by blocking known URLs, but also 
by dynamically analysing the content. While by no means trivial, this problem is limited in that it is only the 
content being sent to the child that needs analysis. These approaches do not apply to two way interactions. Firstly, 
blocking entire sites/protocols is not necessarily desirable as some safe use may be allowed (or else the child 
would be motivated to try work around the blocks). Secondly, the danger a predator poses is not merely displaying 
unwanted material to the child, but in arranging a meeting outside the parents’ control. This can (and may) be done 
without mentioning anything overtly sexual. Predators are a danger because they can effectively mimic normal 
child-to-child conversations. If nothing else, one half could be simply copied and pasted from other conversations 
between actual children. The only difference may be in attempting to meet in person. 
This paper discusses the existing approaches to online child protection and the conflicting requirements of 
the parent and the child in a moderated approach to chat. It presents an idea for a system of anonymous review 
with various options for added functionality, along with a justification of the system. The penultimate section 
expands on the two key technical components – pseudonymous messaging and intelligent text analysis. 
 
 
                                                          
∗
  This paper was originally published in Kierkegaard, S. (2009) Legal Discourse in Cyberlaw and Trade. IAITL. 
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2. Previous Work 
 
Existing approaches to online child protection typically fall into the following broad categories Block, Review, 
Filter and Moderate. To enable the reader to better understand the problem domain these approaches and the 
weaknesses associated with them are examined. 
Blocking restricts access to protocols and applications deemed “unsuitable”, for example peer-to-peer 
(P2P) networks or Instant Messaging (IM). Operating in a simple deny/permit fashion can make blocking 
something of a blunt and unwieldy tool. This lack of flexibility restricts its usefulness only to situations where 
something must be prohibited. 
Reviewing technologies vary in type and application but the core ethos is to allow the parent to monitor the 
child’s activity. Website histories, messaging logs, emails, even full replay of video conference sessions maybe 
recorded. This may be impractical if the child is an avid internet user or in families with multiple children. 
Reviewing also suffers from problems of privacy (older children are particularly sensitive about their privacy and 
may be tempted to circumvent the system) and the generation gap - parents may not be able to penetrate youth 
lingo and slang. 
Filtering may be considered a subset of blocking, usually applied to restrict access to websites considered 
unwholesome in content. Filters generally consist of blacklisted (or whitelisted) URLs, or dynamic blocking of 
websites based on content - typically examining sites for a list of proscribed keywords and phrases. Each of these 
methods suffers drawbacks - blacklisting often involves content labelling, sites labelled as containing certain 
content are blocked. Labelling is performed by the website operator (who may not be aware of the labelling 
scheme or may neglect to use it). Some providers of filtering software manually review sites but this is an 
unscalable approach and the quality of this filtering has been brought into question as has its subjective nature 
(National Research Council. 2002).  
Many internet forums use moderation to enforce rules, edit posts, and ban disruptive users, trolls and 
spammers. Some child oriented forums, including those of the BBC1, operate a process of pre-moderation - each 
message is examined before it is posted. Moderators are trained to screen messages for signs of bullying, 
harassment, or anything that may result in a child being in exposed to harm. Moderation suffers two key 
drawbacks - scalability, and the human bias (subjectivity). 
The system proposed here addresses the issues highlighted above without sacrificing safety. The child can 
feel their privacy is being maintained, although messages of concern are being reviewed, the contents of the 
message will not seen be their parents (thus shielding them from any embarrassment). In this regard the system 
may be considered similar in fashion to traditional moderation - their messages may be reviewed but not by their 
parents - but able to overcome its limitations. 
3. Conflicting requirements 
 
On-line child protection cannot be solved with technology alone. This paper therefore proposes a system that uses 
a combination of automation and human judgement to recognise threats. There are many potential pitfalls in trying 
to solve this problem. One solution might be to give parents comprehensive logs of their child’s internet usage. 
This would be giving them too much information to manage effectively, and would be a tempting target for 
identity theft. If the parent has the power to control exactly what their child does on-line, it is possible they can 
better protect them, but the controls may be overwhelming. Also, children do not want to have their privacy 
violated, and will circumvent the system one way or another if it is too invasive. Even if they do not have the level 
of skill necessary to circumvent the system, they could always spend the majority of their internet time away from 
the home (at school, library, friends, etc). So some level of privacy for the child is needed. Similarly, all access 
that can be given and kept “safe” needs to be allowed. It would also be naive to expect children to suddenly 
migrate onto a new “safe” social network, IM network, etc. Any solution must cater for what they already use. 
4. Description 
 
The proposed system uses existing technology as a pre-filtering stage to create a prioritised list of ‘suspect’ chat 
conversations. This is subsequently analysed using human judgement via a pseudonymous volunteer who sees an 
appropriately sanitised version of the data which does not divulge the identity of the child, thus protecting their 
privacy.  
                                                          
1
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/chatguide/glossary/moderation.shtml 
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The system works as a software client that can be downloaded and run on any PC. The primary user 
(presumably a parent of at least one child), installs and sets up the client. There are two stages to the setup. First, 
the parent must record any sensitive/personal data unique to themselves and their child. This could include names, 
addresses, email/contact info, credit card number, phone numbers, etc. These will be used to determine when the 
child may be giving inappropriate information to a stranger, but also when they are inadvertently identifying 
themselves. The data can be stored as hashed values, or at least encrypted. The second part of the setup is 
performed in conjunction with the child. The parent reviews or “vets” all contacts the child has (in all applications 
/ platforms /networks).  The parent determines which contacts can be considered “safe”. This should only include 
contacts the parent has/can meet in person, or know through some trusted organisation/third-party. At the very 
least, contacts who neither the child nor the parent has met should be considered unsafe. All contacts are labelled 
either “safe”, “uncertain” or “blocked”.  
Once setup, the client runs in the background when the child logs onto the computer. The client intercepts 
all text-based communication protocols before they are presented to the user (the idea is text-based, but see 
Section 4.8 for voice/video extension). All communications between the child and contacts that have been 
explicitly labelled safe by the parent continue unimpeded and un-monitored. Any communications to/and from a 
contact that has been labelled uncertain, or from a new contact get processed. The processing works as follows: 
 
1. All received text from the contact and keystrokes from the child are stored. 
2. The text is checked against a list of known problem words/phrases (“sex”, “drugs”, “would you like to 
meet”, etc.) 
3. Other probabilistic analysis is performed (Bayesian network analysis, Gaussian modelling, etc.) 
looking for indicators of unwanted behaviour. 
4. The text is searched for any of the sensitive/personal data entered by the adult. If any is found it is 
removed and noted. 
5. The results from all these tests are combined in a single weighted score. 
6. The identifier for the contact (email address, Skype name, etc.) is stored as a keyed hash using the 
child’s password (could be their login password). 
 
The processing is done on a section of text of a limited size (a page), and only on communications between 
the child and one contact. The client stores the processed logs in a list prioritised by the results of the analysis in 
the above list (top of the list will be the highest match with expected pattern of a predator). As noted in the fourth 
step, all sensitive/personal data will be removed from the log (can be replaced with a generic placeholder). Rather 
than just using the data the parent entered in the initial setup, a dictionary of names/local places could also be used 
to sanitise the logs. Periodically the client will send the logs at the top of the list to another client. Even with the 
sanitisation of personal data and replacing contact details with hashed values, in order to protect the privacy of the 
child, the logs will be sent over a pseudonymous network (Kinateder, Terdic & Rothermel, 2005). This allows 
messages to be passed from client to client, without either being able to discover who the other party is. This 
works through repeated layers of encryption and routing through various different nodes on the network. The idea 
is to create a community of effort where parents are reviewing each others children’s logs, but in an anonymous 
manner. The technology used in anonymous communications is described in Section 6. 
The receiving client (of the logs) will be administered by another parent. They will be presented with the 
sanitised logs and asked “Is this something the parent should be concerned with?” The reply can either be a yes/no 
button, or a scale e.g. from 1 to 10. The second parent can also highlight the text of the logs that is objectionable 
and a specific reason, e.g. “contact trying to meet child”, “inappropriate sexual content of messages”, “child is 
revealing personal information/identifying him/herself or home location”. The results are returned to the first 
parent, again through the pseudonymous network. The first parent will be presented with only those logs (still 
sanitised) where the reviewer thought there was a problem. The particular application and time/date can be made 
known to the parent, but the identity of the other contact is still protected by the child’s password. The parent can 
then decide whether to list the contact as “blocked” preventing any further communication, discuss the matter with 
their child to determine if the contact can be added to the safe list, or leave the contact “unknown” and continue 
monitoring.  
Figure 1 shows a typical example. In the example, there is a central server called the Match Maker that 
maintains a list of pseudonymous clients that are on-line. An adult can request the details of one or more clients 
from the Match Maker. An alternative method that distributes this information throughout the network is also 
possible, and discussed in Section 6. The numbered steps in Figure 1 are explained below: 
 
 
1. Adult1 downloads software client. 
2. Adult1 installs client and configures settings (records sensitive data). 
3. Adult1 and Child1 agree all safe contacts. 
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4. Child1 interacts with contacts. Communication with safe contacts continues as normal. 
Communication with uncertain contacts monitored. 
5. Monitoring consists of analysis as described in previous list. 
6. Suspect logs are stored in priority list based on results of analysis. 
7. Client1 queries Match Maker server over pseudonymous network for list of online clients. 
8. Client1 selects from list and sends sanitised logs for review. 
9. Adult2 checks sanitised logs for undesirable communication. 
10. Logs returned to Client1 with rating results. 
11. Adult1 takes any necessary action based on feedback. 
 
The most important part of the system is step 9. In order to encourage good behaviour in the clients, each 
adult will only receive results from the pseudonymous network about their children when they have finished a 
certain amount of reviews for other clients. This promotes good behaviour. This can be taken a step further by 
enabling a reputation system at the Match Maker server. This would record feedback from adults who found the 
results they received helpful. The reputation would be tied to the pseudonym and the person behind it would 
remain unknown, but they could be rewarded by being given a higher priority when requesting (clients for) 
reviews of their own logs, both in terms of speed and the quality of the rated reviewer.  
The following section presents several variations that may improve the overall system, but which should be 
considered optional as they may have downsides, depending on the implementation details and user requirements. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Communication flow for Pseudonymous Peer Review 
 
4.1. Monitoring all communications 
 
The client could be configured to monitor all communications, including those between the child and safe 
contacts, but with a higher threshold needed for logs to be stored and sent for review. This negates more of the 
privacy the child has, but is still a great deal better than traditional monitoring: the contact can still be protected 
with the child’s password, and only logs that have been considered problematic get passed on to the parent. It may 
be appropriate for younger children. 
4.2. Multiple reviewers 
 
The client can send the logs to several other clients for review. This will likely reduce the time it takes for a 
response, and the redundancy will give the parent more confidence in the results. The downside is the increased 
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burden on reviewers. But given that there may only be a few logs sent, and they can probably be reviewed very 
quickly, it is likely a good balance can be achieved. For example, the client sends all of the top 3 logs to 3 different 
clients (sending out 9 in total), but can only review results once they have reviewed 9 other logs. This approach 
has the benefit of normalising the reviewing process – the effect of a wildly liberal or conservative response would 
be brought closer to the prevailing societal attitude. 
4.3. Instant reaction 
 
Because of the human component of the review process, there will be a delay in the response time. One option that 
could be considered is that if a given log has a particularly high score, then the client can immediately block 
communication with that contact and notify the adult, bypassing the anonymous reviewer process. Careful 
configuration would be needed to avoid too many false alarms. Likewise, the sanitisation could be applied as a 
filter to all out going communications, not just the stored logs. 
This may not be necessary – research indicates (Walsh & Wolak. 2005) that where a victim and sex 
offender met, the online relationship typically formed over a month or more, from multiple conversations. These 
would likely have already being flagged, reviewed and reported to a parent. 
4.4. Learning behaviour 
 
If the feedback from the reviewers is sufficiently detailed (selection of problem words/phrases, reasons for 
choice), then it would be possible for the clients to improve their scoring/prioritisation algorithms. This could 
either be done locally, or centrally at the Match Maker server. Learning at the central server could be very 
efficient, but would introduce problems with keeping submissions anonymous and being able to trust submissions. 
Learning locally at the client would not have any privacy problems, but would have a much smaller selection of 
results to draw from and hence a slower rate of learning. 
4.5. Use of dictionary 
 
The client could use a dictionary of common names to sanitise the child’s logs. Certain patterns could be 
identified, such as phone numbers, credit card numbers, postcodes, etc. When the adult enters the home address, a 
central service might be able to provide a list of all nearby street names, local monuments, and locations that could 
be used by the child to give directions. This could also be incorporated into the scoring mechanism as well as the 
sanitisation. 
4.6. Re-vetting 
 
A good precaution would be for the adult to periodically re-vet the child’s safe contacts. Strangers are not the only 
sources of potential threats to young children, and asking the child about their relationships with their peers could 
bring to light early warning signs. 
4.7. Impersonation prevention 
 
The times and duration the child has been on-line can be safely stored without fear of privacy invasion. When the 
adult logs in, a simple calendar with the child’s usage can be graphically presented. This prevents the most 
obvious circumvention method. If there are no usage hours recorded for large amounts of time the parent knows 
the child was using the computer, then the parent knows the child has circumvented the system (most likely by 
using the parent’s or another un-monitored account). 
4.8. Voice/Video chats 
 
As previously described the system is text-based. This can be extended to voice/video, such as commonly found in 
IM products such as Skype/MSN, etc. This requires the use of Speech Recognition Techniques. This technology is 
currently of limited maturity, but could potentially be employed for keyword spotting. This will slot easily into the 
proposed system converting the video/audio stream into a text document. This also adds further protection of 
privacy than would be had by direct monitoring of the video/audio. 
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4.9 Age of Children 
 
The definition of “a child” covers a large range of ages and maturities. Ultimately the decision to allow a child to 
use the internet for chat resides with the parent; however, a total prohibition would likely lead to using the 
technology anyway and without parental oversight. The best result is achieved when child and parent have a strong 
relationship and agree on what is, and what is not permitted. Internet initiated grooming of pre-pubescent children 
is extremely rare (Wolak, et al. 2008) (Lanning, K. 2001), partly because they are more closely supervised and 
also because it is difficult to engage them in sexual/romantic conversation because of their immaturity. 
This system is best suited to children approaching puberty. They can be informed that (like adults) they are 
being rewarded with privacy in return for abiding by the rules. As they enter puberty, become sexually aware, and 
start to desire privacy they will already be familiar with the system. The child would continue to use the system 
until they reached a suitable level of maturity so that it was no longer needed or they reached adulthood. 
Conversations of concern that are sent for moderation would include an indication of the child’s age. This 
would have a bearing on what would be deemed appropriate. 
5. Justification 
 
In order for this system to work, active participation of all parties is required. The system has deliberately been 
designed to encourage good behaviour. The child is motivated to convince the parent that his/her contacts are 
trustworthy in order to have confidential communications. The parent is encouraged to provide meaningful 
reviews, in order to get a better reputation, which will result in speedier replies. The process of reviewing can also 
be of direct benefit to the reviewing adults themselves. It is educational, in that they are made aware of the kind of 
dangers that exist on-line and what their child may be exposed to. This better places them to discuss the problems 
with their child and agree what is safe/acceptable internet usage.  
The shortcomings of existing approaches to this problem have been highlighted, and the approach 
described here overcomes these issues. Conversations, emails and message board postings will be monitored by 
the emerging generation of intelligent text analysis tools to spot conversations of concern. Only these 
conversations will be submitted for manual/human review. This process overcomes the scalability issues 
associated with traditional moderation, vastly reducing the reviewer’s workload. The community nature of the 
approach also negates the cost associated with the traditional moderation model. 
Any single moderator reviewing a conversation of concern will be subject to the human condition - 
bringing their own bias and prejudice into the review process. Using multiple moderators for each conversation of 
concern will reduce the impact of any one error in judgement. For example say a conversation of concern is 
reviewed by a conservative individual and someone of a more liberal mindset, an average of their result/feedback 
will tend towards the centre ground. Here “centre ground” is meant as the general view of society at large. 
The moderator will be faced with the hurdle of slang employed by children and may need assistance 
interpreting the contents of some message (conversations of concern). It is hoped that such information will be 
sought from the moderator’s own children. The benefits of this will be twofold; the parent will gain a better 
understanding of trends, challenges and experiences of young people in the modern world helping them to better 
understand their own children. From reviewing the contents of the messages (conversations of concern) both 
parent (moderator) and child can learn first hand of the dangers that exist. This will be informative for the parent 
and can serve as a warning for the child. 
6. Components 
 
This section gives a very brief description of how the technical aspects of the system might be implemented. This 
system relies heavily on the use of pseudonymous communications, along with the dependent technology of 
Distributed Hash Tables. The first subsection describes the work by Kinateder, et al (2005), the second deals with 
the work of Stoica, Morris, Karger, Kaashoek & Balakrishnan, (2006) and the third describes how text 
classifications are best applied to this system. 
6.1 Pseudonymous Communications 
 
In order to protect the anonymity of the child, the parent and the reviewer, a communication system with the 
following properties is required: 
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• the sender has some ephemeral/indirect knowledge of the receiver, but not their actual address 
• the receiver cannot know the address of the sender 
• the receiver can reply to the sender 
• no observation of the network gives any information about who is communicating with whom 
 
These are all achieved with the use of public key encryption and intermediaries. It is assumed that there is a 
network of nodes, called mixes, capable of processing messages (encryption/decryption) and passing them on. 
These nodes are not trusted, and while they can disrupt the communications by not participating as expected, it is 
imperative that they learn nothing by analysing messages as they pass through. It is also assumed that public keys 
for all parties can be readily obtained (as well as the addresses of the mixes). 
However they are stored, the public keys are used to ensure that only the recipient can decrypt the message, 
but does not help in anonymously delivering the message. Along with the public key, one or more pseudonym is 
stored. These are created by those who want to receive anonymous communications (the recipient) and will be 
used by a sender. The pseudonym is a sequence of addresses of mixes, but nested in layers of encryption that 
ensure that only the next mix can decrypt the current layer and they only get the address of the next mix. The 
further layers of encryption mean that a mix cannot know any further destinations than the next mix, and they do 
not know any of the previous mixes in the chain since these addresses have been stripped off. Since knowledge of 
the path of the route is effectively split amongst all these independent entities, it would be impossible to determine 
the ultimate sender and receiver for a given message without compromising the majority of the network.  
There are other ways to increase anonymity, sending messages in batches to confound traffic analysis, 
sender adding more mixes to the sequence to protect against dishonest recipients, etc. For more details see 
(Kinateder, et al. 2005). It is also preferable to store the public keys/pseudonyms in a Distributed Hash Table, 
rather than a single server. This is described in (Stoica, et al. 2006). 
6.2. Text Classification 
 
Traditional keyword and regular expression filters are inadequate for analysing IM and chat forum conversations. 
The new generation of text mining and text analysis tools offer far superior classification abilities. Word 
frequency, word distance, word pairs (bi-grams), Latent Semantic Analysis, term strength, term frequency-inverse 
document frequency (tf-idf), and term by document matrices have all proven successful at extracting features from 
textual sources. These features are subsequently applied to statistical modelling techniques including Bayesian 
analysis, k-Nearest Neighbour and Support Vector Machines (Tretyakov, 2004) (Conrad & Hunter, 1994). These 
techniques have proven results in spam detection, document categorisation, authorship attribution and information 
mining (Aas & Eikvil, 1999). 
Classification techniques such as these typically compare new information against known values and 
categorise it accordingly. For example, a new email will be analysed and the result compared against the result for 
known spam and ham (legitimate email). This process poses a problem in the child protection domain. 
In order to classify conversations as safe or uncertain they need to be compared against known paedophile, 
and normal chat models. Constructing normal chat models is a trivial task, constructing paedophile (chat) models 
is not. To construct an accurate model access to paedophile chat logs is required. Law enforcement does not 
typically share this information freely. Honey trap organisations such as Perverted Justice2 publish chat logs from 
sting operations (against paedophiles) on their website. Research (Wolak, J., Finkelhor, D., Mitchell, K., & 
Ybarra, M. 2008) indicates the in the majority of online sexual predation the offender quickly reveals his true age 
and intentions – this tallies with the chat logs of Perverted Justice. Pendar’s (2007) work shows that Bayesian 
trigram analysis is effective at detecting grooming (based on Perverted Justice chat logs). The operating practices 
of Perverted Justice have been called in to question and allegations of entrapment and poor evidentiary quality 
have been made (Stokley, 2008) (Salkin, 2006). As a consequence of this, the reliability of these chat logs to 
represent “real world” logs must be considered uncertain. The following proposes another method that may also be 
suitable - a system of thresholding. 
Rather than classifying based on the results of messages matching against two categories/models (normal 
chat and suspicious), a match against a single model with a threshold value could be used instead. Conversations 
would be compared against the normal chat model; those matching closely (with a probability above a certain 
threshold) would be considered normal and not be affected. Conversations poorly matching the model (below the 
threshold) would be marked as “uncertain” and passed on to the system for evaluation by a moderator. In addition, 
those conversations falling well below the threshold might be marked for priority moderation/inspection. 
                                                          
2
 http://perverted-justice.com 
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In order for the process to work a normal chat model would first need to be trained. The child’s online chat 
activities over a given time would be used to train the initial model. This model will serve as baseline of normal 
behaviour. Once the training process is complete, online conversations are compared against the model. During the 
initial training of the model it will not be able to flag problems. As the text classification is just one of several 
tools used to identify potentially suspicious behaviour, other mechanisms are still available. Key word matches 
with known general problem phrases and scrubbing of specific personal details is still performed. And to further 
protect the child (and ensure a “clean” model) the parent can require that no communication with new contacts is 
allowed for the period of the training. After the initial training period there are likely to be a number of false 
positive, especially if the training period is brief. If, for example, the child only converses with their peer group 
during the training of the model, a conversation with a parent or grandparent would be flagged as anomalous. This 
should be considered a period of normalisation. As the review process records the conversation as a false positive, 
the text of the conversation can be used to tune the initial model. 
7. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a concept, whereby parents can have “conversations of concern” reviewed anonymously by 
other parents in return for their own actions as reviewers. The limits of existing technical measures to protect 
children have been highlighted and it is proposed that the system described here could help bridge the gap through 
a community approach.  
The merits of this idea do not come solely from the technology, but rather from several deliberate reward 
mechanisms for the users. Children are encouraged to play-by-the-rules and are rewarded with privacy. Parents 
who are conscientious reviewers will get a better view of the dangers their children are exposed to. The technology 
provides the means for what would be sensitive information to be shared in a safe way. Great lengths have been 
made to avoid anything that could be considered censoring by the end-users. All of this is combined to strike the 
best balance between the child’s safety and their freedom on-line. 
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